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Interesting that the disciplinary commission found a violation of the excessive-fees rule, MR 1.5(a), even though the client directed the litigation strategy. The client didn't get value for her money, because the course of discovery was not directed toward establishing a legitimate legal entitlement of the client, i.e. it was frivolous. What's interesting is that the client subjectively believed she was getting value, but the disciplinary commission found, in effect, that it wasn't objectively valuable. (More support for my contention, made in connection with MR 2.1, that subjective standards of reasonableness simply aren't a part of the regulation of lawyers.)
Posted by: Brad Wendel | March 22, 2010 at 09:11 AM
Brad,
It brings to mind the case involving the artist Jeff Koons, who asked his divorce lawyers to spare no expense -- and they sure didn't. Koons lost a suit against them, on the grounds that they did what he asked.
But to get back to my hopeless formalisms, if MR 1.5 says "reasonable" is the standard for fees, I have no objection to the use of an objective test. (Indeed, it seems required.) But I don't see the logic in an argument that "because 1.5 uses an expressly objective test regarding fees, it follows that all model rules on all topics do so as well, regardless of the text of the rules."
Posted by: John Steele | March 24, 2010 at 09:29 PM