No vehicles in the park

I've been trying to work in some statutory interpretation into my ethics class, and when I passed this sign while cycling to work I knew I had to snap a pic. As you can plainly see, "no vehicles in the park" isn't just a hypothetical. One phrase in California's ethics rules that's useful for playing the game of core-meaning-vs-peripheral-meaning is the phrase in our doing business with a client rule (3-300): "A member shall not enter into a business transaction with a client; or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client, unless each of the following requirements has been satisfied  . .  ."

Comments

[Andrew Perlman]

I start my civil procedure course with the "no vehicles" hypo. It's a classic. I ask my students to craft arguments for a client who has to pay a substantial fine for driving a segway through the park. It's a great introduction to statutory (or rule) interpretation.

[John Steele]

yeah, it's so simple and it really tees up the issue. feel free to use that photo if you want.

[mitchell Simon]

I also use it in my first year Fundamentals of Law Practice course. Thanks for the photo.

[John Steele]

You're welcome. Feel free to use my photo if it helps. I release it to the world.

(What was funny was that I found myself doing the interpretation game. I wanted to ride a couple hundred yards down the path to see what was there, but I didn't have time to walk it, and so I was thinking about what the phrase meant in that context.)

[Monroe Freedman]

I like the vehicles in the park hypo, and have used it in the past in other courses. But for Ethics, I prefer to raise the question of whether MR 1.6(b)(2) is redundant in view of 1.6(b)(3).

[John Steele]

Monroe, serious question: if we added the words "rectify" and "mitigate" to (b)(2), would there be any need for (b)(3)?

[Monroe Freedman]

I don't think so, John. Or you could add "is using" to (3). But that shouldn't be necessary, because (3) contemplates that the fraud can still be "prevent[ed]," so it would appear that the client's fraud is still at work, and therefore that the lawyer's services are still a factor in an incomplete, ongoing scheme to harm the third party.

Comment [8] is a puzzler here. It says that (3) addresses the situation in which the lawyer doesn't learn of the fraud "until after it has been consummated." But if the fraud has been consummated (completed or made perfect, according to my dictionary), then it can no longer be "prevent[ed]," although its effects might still be mitigated or rectified.

But according to the Scope section, paras. [14] and [21], the Comments are only "guides to interpretation," which "do not add obligations to the Rules," and it's only the "text of each rule" that is "authoritative." So Comment [8] can't override the text of (3).