SCOTUS decides mailroom mixup case in favor of criminal defendant

The Supreme Court issued an opinion in Maples v. Thomas today, the case involving a death row appeal handled initially by lawyers at Sullivan and Cromwell who left the firm, so never received copies of a critical ruling in the case.  Apparently the ruling was returned by mailroom staff unopened to the court, and a clerk put the envelop in a file without doing anything more.  And the S&C lawyers never notified the court of their withdrawal.

Writing for the 7-2 majority (Scalia dissented with Thomas joining), Justice Ginsburg observed:

The sole question this Court has taken up for review is whether, on the extraordinary facts of Maples’ case, there is “cause” to excuse the default. Maples maintains that there is, for the lawyers he believed to be vigilantly representing him had abandoned the case without leave of court, without informing Maples they could no longer represent him, and without securing any recorded substitution of counsel. We agree. Abandoned by counsel, Maples was left unrepresented at a critical time for his state post-conviction petition, and he lacked a clue of any need to protect himself pro se. In these circumstances, no just system would lay the default at Maples’ death-cell door. Satisfied that the requisite cause has been shown, we reverse the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment.

The full opinion is here.

Comments

[Monroe Freedman]

The importance of Maples is not clear. Although the Court allows Maples to assert his constitutional claims in federal court, Ginsburg says that the court is not “disturb[ing]” the general rule, which is that the client, sitting on death row, is the “master” and is therefore responsible for any error on the part of his “servant,” the lawyer. The Court held that Maples is distinguishable, because Sullivan & Cromwell had ceased being Maples’ agent.

The rule goes back to an O’Connor opinion in Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (1991). There, the lawyer miscalculated the time to file a “purely ministerial document” in the Virginia state court. The late filing was “no doubt an inadvertent error” by Coleman’s court-appointed lawyer, and the State acknowledged that in no sense had Coleman “understandably and knowingly” given up his appeal. As a result of his inadvertent mathematical error, Coleman’s lawyer had filed a notice of appeal in the Virginia trial court 72 hours late. Accordingly, Virginia refused to hear his appeal, and this, in turn, was held to preclude the federal courts from hearing Coleman’s seven constitutional issues, one of which, in a later case, was held to be meritorious. Coleman was therefore killed by Virginia.

The Supreme Court expressly relied on the Restatement (Second) of Agency sec. 242 (1958) (master is subject to liability for harm caused by negligent conduct of servant within the scope of employment). The rule, of course, is designed for the situation where, for example, Exxon hires an alcoholic to be captain of an oil tanker, and the captain wrecks the ship, causing a destructive oil spill. In that case, according to the Restatement, Exxon (called “the master”) is liable in money damages for the negligence of the captain (“the servant”). Therefore (?!), Coleman – the “master” – deserved to be executed.

We can only hope that Maples signals the abandonment altogether of the Court's agency rule.

[Stephen Gillers]

An overlooked part of Maples, so far as I can tell, is that S&C's work for Maples's was done in the name of the two associates without the S&C name. This is implied in the majority opinion and express in the dissent. That is, it appears that Associates A and B were listed as counsel of record, with their NY firm address, but without the firm name.

I am told that this is not unique to S&C. What is the reason for it (assuming my reading is correct)? To avoid associating the firm name with a capital case and any publicity that may ensue? If the firm name were included in the notice to the departed associates, I assume the mailroom would not have returned the court notice unopened.

Justice Alito calls this a "perfect storm" and perhaps it is. Let's hope it is a "unique" situation, as he writes. The case is narrow, turning as it does on a finding that the two associates abaondoned Maples -- the Court is uanimous there -- and that no other lawyer was legally able to represent him when the time to apeal expired. Or the one lawyer who remained -- lcoal counsel -- had excluded that responsbility from the scope of work.

But the case is important, very important, for another reason unrelated to the holding. Firms -- whether or not they appear in their firm names or let their lawyers do pro bono work in their own names -- must pay as much attention to pro bono clients as to paying ones. Associates, who do I suspect the bulk of pro bono work, leave far more often than do partners. If attention is not paid, there will be representational gaps in the handing off of the matter and those gaps may occur during a deadline period, as here.