An article in today's Washington Post reveals that John Roberts interviewed with administration officials, including Alberto Gonzales, Dick Cheney, and Karl Rove, while sitting as a member of the three-judge panel that was considering Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. The D.C. Circuit in that case reversed an injunction obtained by a Guantanamo Bay detainee, halting trials before military commissions at Gitmo. Meetings took place before oral argument in the case, and as late as July 15th, the date the opinion was issued.
The judicial ethics question is whether Roberts should have recused himself once it became apparent that he was being considered by the administration as the replacement for Justice O'Connor. Factually, the "theory of the case" for recusal is that Roberts might have favored the administration's position (which eventually won over all three members of the panel) as a quid pro quo in exchange for the nomination. Or, less dramatically, he might have been moved by a spirit of gratitude to take the administration's arguments more seriously. After all, the military commission trials are central to the administration's strategy for dealing with suspected terrorists.
The applicable recusal standard is found in 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): A judge must recuse himself or herself in any case in which the judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned." See also ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E)1. The key word here is "reasonably." Allegations of impropriety and vague insinuations are not enough. That much is clear from Justice Scalia's memo denying recusal in the duck-hunting case -- see Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004).
The best argument against recusal here is that it would unrealistically burden federal judges, particularly in the D.C. Circuit, in which the administration is often a party. (Monroe Freedman makes this argument in the WaPo article.) If Roberts were required to recuse himself under these circumstances, wouldn't the principle apply by analogy to a case in which a judge who was hoping to be a nominee was on a panel considering a case important to the administration? Speculation continues that Chief Justice Rehnquist may step down. What happens to all of the judges on the proverbial "short list" -- do Michael Luttig, Pricilla Owen, and Edith Brown Clement have to recuse themselves to avoid the appearance that they attempted to curry favor with the administration?
The other argument against recusal is that the evidence does not support an inference of impropriety. After all, two other judges sided with Roberts, who did not write the panel opinion. I am not by any means an expert on separation of powers, military law, or international humanitarian law, but from what I do know, the Hamdan opinion does not seem like raving lunacy -- i.e. something that could be explained only as an attempt to suck up to the administration, not a good-faith application of law.
UPDATE: A formidable trio of legal ethics experts -- Steven Gillers, David Luban, and Steven Lubet -- have published an article in Slate arguing that Roberts should have recused himself. Their principal contention is that Roberts's participation created an appearance of impropriety, even though there may have been no actual impropriety. My quarrel is not with their application of the standard, but with the appearance of impropriety standard itself.
The appearance standard is not part of the recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), but courts applying the statute have often extended it to cases in which the judge's conduct might create the appearance of bias. See Richard E. Flamm, Judicial Disqualification: Recusal and Disqualification of Judges § 24.2.2. The idea is that satisfying the more stringent appearance of impropriety standard will satisfy the public that the judicial process is free from bias. I think focusing on appearances, rather than the actual circumstances that might create bias, is an unhelpful distraction in judicial ethics. It's true that the Supreme Court often talks in terms of appearances -- not only in the Liljeberg case cited in the Slate article, but also in the leading case of Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540 (1994). Maybe this is a radical argument, but I think the discussions of appearance of bias, as distinguished from facts suggesting actual bias, are dicta, and we can analyze these cases without a freestanding concept of appearance of impropriety. Moreover, we should, because the standard stinks.
The first problem is how we ascertain the appearance of impropriety, apart from any actual impropriety. In the duck-hunting case, Justice Scalia noted ascerbically that many of the editorials calling for his recusal did not even have the facts right. What evidentiary showing would someone have to make to prove appearance of impropriety in the Roberts case? It would be hard to separate public outrage at this case from general outrage at the Bush administration's handling of the Gitmo detainees, or the war on terror (or global struggle against violent extremism, or whatever the heck they're calling it now). Also, as the Scalia memo in the duck-hunting case points out, we'd have to ascertain that op-ed writers, those surveyed in public opinion polls, elite opinion-makers, etc. have their facts straight. In addition, the test seems to invite subjectivity -- as a Democrat, I might be harsher on Roberts because I generally impute malicious motives to the administration. Surely my suspicion of Roberts must be reasonable, in order to count toward the appearance of impropriety. But if reasonable suspicion is the test, then what does the appearance standard add to the general reasonable evidence of bias standard of the statute? Once it's clear that not any ol' allegation of bias will do, the appearance standard collapses into the objective standard of Section 455(a).
Second, and I believe a much more substantial problem, is the tension between the appearance of impropriety standard and the balancing of policies apparent elsewhere in the law of judicial disqualification. For example, a panel at the ABA Professional Responsiblity section annual meeting discussed a hypothetical in which a judge was active in the Boy Scouts, which discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation. (Professors Gillers and Lubet were on the panel.) Should the judge be disqualified from a matter in which the custodial rights of same-sex parents were at issue? The July 2004 draft revisions to the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct provide that a judge may not "hold membership in any organization that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of . . . sexual orientation." But, "invidious discrimination" is further defined in comment [1] to exclude an "intimate, purely private organization whose membership limitations could not be constitutionally prohibited." Obviously the drafters of the rule are trying to accomplish a complex, delicate balancing of policies here -- protecting the right of citizens to be free from invidious discrimination, but also protecting the associational liberties of judges. Whether one agrees or not with the balance struck by the rule, the important thing is that the "appearance of impropriety" standard blows up the compromise, by requiring the judge to guess at whether recusal would be required in situations not covered by the rule governing actual bias. The rule would not reach the Boy Scouts, because of the Supreme Court's Dale decision, but one might argue that active participation in activities of the Boy Scouts nevertheless constitutes an appearance of impropriety. Thus, the careful balancing of the rule is out the window and the disqualification issue is unnecessarily muddled.
One final point is that the arguments in favor of disqualifying Roberts in Hamdan and Scalia in the duck-hunting case seem to get the causation backwards: Dick Cheney didn't invite Scalia to go duck hunting with him because Scalia was a liberal or a moderate, whose vote might be purchased by a little boondoggle to Louisiana. Rather, Cheney and Scalia went on the trip together because they were friends, and they were friends in part because they are ideologically compatible. Scalia's predisposition to side with the administration (if he has one, and if he is not able to overcome it in particular cases with a stronger disposition to serve as an impartial judge) preceded the trip, and was arguably part of the cause of the trip. Similarly, any disposition Roberts might have to side with the administration in Hamdan was not caused by gratitude for being considered for the Supremes -- rather, Roberts's candidacy was "caused" in some sense by this preexisting disposition.
I tend to think that underlying many appearance of impropriety arguments is unease with judges making decisions, in part, based on contestable political values. However, the ideal of impartial judging does not require judges to be blank slates. Roberts is going to be on the administration's side more often than not, but that's not the kind of "bias" that should be disqualifying.
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