Thanks to Mike Frisch for the pointer to a recent Vermont Supreme Court opinion that rejects a constitutional challenge to the admission by motion procedures in that state. In essence, the Court concluded that those procedures are constitutional because they do not discriminate against out-of-state citizens. The Court explained that the admission by motion rules impose the same requirements regardless of whether someone resides in Vermont, making the rules effectively citizenship-neutral.
The constitutional argument is particularly interesting to me, since I wrote an article a couple of years ago that explained why rules (like those in Vermont) violate the privileges and immunities clause, the privileges or immunities clause (yes, those are two different provisions), and the dormant commerce clause. Since I wrote the article, the argument has been advanced twice -- once in a Fourth Circuit decision and again in the Vermont case. Unfortunately, both courts have rejected the theory (alas, without citing my article!), but I'm still hopeful that some court, some day will see it differently.
The essence of my argument is that, although many admissions rules are neutral on their face in that they don't explicitly discriminate on the basis of citizenship status, the intent behind many such rules (e.g., requiring out-of-state lawyers to re-take the entire bar exam, including the MBE) is to make it more difficult for out-of-state citizens or newly arrived residents to gain permanent admission. As I explain in the article, discriminatory intent or effect in this context can overcome what is otherwise a facially neutral rule, making many admissions rules unconstitutional forms of discrimination.