Dennis J. Ventry Jr., of American University, has published "Cooperative Tax Regulation" at SSRN. Here's an abstract.
The last thirty years have witnessed unprecedented tax avoidance. Corporate tax shelters have cost the government hundreds of billions of dollars in lost revenue, and the annual "tax gap" (the difference between what taxpayers should pay and what they pay on a timely basis) exceeds $400 billion. There are many explanations for overaggressive taxpayer behavior. But adversarial ethical standards for tax professionals and equally adversarial command-and-control tax regulation have been especially culpable in creating the perfect tax avoidance storm.
Debased ethical guidelines promulgated by the American Bar Association and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, in combination with government efforts to regulate tax practice, produced a competitive rather than a cooperative regulatory environment. Practice standards steeped in adversarial norms fostered tax shelter behavior among tax practitioners. They authorized tax advisors to assert "any colorable claim" in the name of client advocacy, to advise "noncompliance with scienter," and to view the filing of a tax return as a first offer. Combined with audit rates ranging between one and two percent, taxpayers and their advisors confidently played the "audit lottery" and resolved all questionable positions in the taxpayer-client’s favor. Social norms that rewarded clever tax planning and standards of tax practice emphasizing a client-centered ethical structure subordinated professional duty in upholding the nation’s tax laws to unalloyed client advocacy and tax minimization. Meanwhile, the organized bar failed to rein in members participating in overaggressive tax planning. Beginning in the early 1980s, the abject failure of self-regulation prompted the Treasury Department to deputize tax practitioners (largely involuntarily) and to promulgate disciplinary standards to fill the ethical void left by the professional associations. As Treasury and Congress ramped up efforts to curb tax avoidance with top-down regulation, aggressive tax advisors performed an end around the government. Tax shelter transactions grew increasingly complex at the same time the IRS faced serious shortfalls in money, personnel, and expertise. An eviscerated tax agency was left to enforce tax laws with tools that prompted more rather than less avoidance.
This Article describes a new approach to tax regulation based on cooperation, information sharing, and interest convergence. It accepts the findings of general prevention studies in the criminal literature indicating that taxpayers will comply with the law in the presence of effective deterrence and enforcement, but it reconceptualizes traditional notions of deterrence and enforcement. To this end, the Article optimizes the use of penalties as a compliance instrument by, among other things, rewarding compliant taxpayers, engaging taxpayers and their advisors in a participatory process, and utilizing cognitive devices that portray payment of taxes as a bonus rather than nonpayment of taxes as a penalty. Even with optimal penalties, tax officials cannot currently enforce the law effectively due to severe resource and information asymmetries. To overcome these debilitating shortcomings, the government must improve funding, recruiting, training, and retention. It must also partner with taxpayers and practitioners to strengthen detection, enforcement, and prosecution of abusive tax avoidance. If successfully implemented, cooperative tax regulation can accomplish a cultural shift not only in taxpaying, but also in tax advising and tax administration. Ultimately, it can produce a regulatory environment of collaboration rather than adversity, ex ante resolution rather than ex post controversy, and certainty rather than secrecy.
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