Ed Whelan is an articulate commentator on legal ethics over at National Review Online. Unlike many commentators, conservatives and liberals, who throw darts without careful (or sometimes any) analysis, Whelan does closely parse the issues and understands the doctrines. He seems to understand that the rules should be respected and are not there to be manipulated in order to achieve a desired answer. In other words, the answers the doctrines indicate should be the same whatever the issue.
In a recent NRO post critical of my views on the effort retroactively to recuse former Judge Vaughn Walker in the Prop. 8 case, he makes the following two points. I invite response here, especially to the second:
1. My position has been that Walker had no interest in the outcome in the Prop. 8 case unless he wanted to marry his partner and to do so in California. He can always marry elsewhere. Whelan disagrees. A marriage elsewhere would not be recognized in California and Walker should be seen to have an interest in home state recognition. He writes:
"Among other things, the continued existence of Prop 8 should mean that California would not recognize a same-sex marriage performed today in another state."
And he adds as a second Walker interest:
"Further, a reasonable person would understand that there are plenty of reasons why someone who has made California his permanent residence might want to marry only in California."
Of course, this response has traction only if Walker wished to marry at all. If he has no interest in marrying anywhere, the two disqualifying interests Whelan cites would be gone.
But the question remains: Assuming (though we have no basis to do so) that Walker wants to marry at all, is the interest in California's recognition of the marriage a basis for recusal? And are there "plenty of reasons why someone who has made California his permanent residence might want to marry only in California?" And even if there are "plenty of reasons," are those reasons sufficient to warrant disqualification?
2. Whelan and others say that if Walker's ability to marry elsewhere eliminates the interest in the case that would be a basis to disqualify him, then it is also true that the plaintiffs' ability to marry elsewhere eliminates the interest they need to have standing to bring the case.
This is a clever argument. Of course, these are two distinct doctrines -- judicial disqualification and standing -- and an interest analysis under the former doctrine (disqualification) tells us little or nothing about the interest analysis under the second (standing) doctrine. Still, the argument requires a response, though from the Art III standing experts, which I'm not.
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