Binta, et al. v. Gordon, et al.
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/13a0072p-06.pdf
The Sixth Circuit issued a long and thorough opinion on attorneys fees in a suit against Tennessee. Although the reference to dry cleaning and mini-blinds catches my attention, the more interesting issue is the way that a large case can "create its own climate" (my words; not the court's) as the lawyers continute to litigate enforcement of the original victory. The opening paragraphs:
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Congress and the Supreme Court have made it abundantly clear that the aim of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 “is not for the purpose of aiding lawyers. The purpose of th[e] bill is to aid civil rights.” 122 CONG. REC. 33,314 (Sept. 29, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992)(“awards under § 1988 were never intended to produce windfalls to attorneys . . . .”). Yet, Congress’ allowance for fees under § 1988 occasionally is misunderstood and misused. The original petition for fees in this case, for example, yielded requests for dry cleaning bills, mini blinds, and health insurance. Though these requests were later dropped after being challenged, they exemplify the overcompensation some attorneysare apt to seek in litigation of this type—decades long class actions involving thousands of hours of work, numerous iterations of consent decrees, and years in-between spent
enforcing and defending prior successes.
[p]
There are two sides to these attorney-fee debates, and we must honor both of them. On the one hand, § 1988 plays a critical role in “ensur[ing] that federal rights are adequately enforced,” and attorneys have every right to be compensated for any fees and expenses they reasonably incur. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1671 (2010). On the other hand, these cases can all too easily become a way of life for the attorneys involved, and consequently over time it can become increasingly unclear, for both the attorneys and the courts, precisely what work falls within the ambit of § 1988. This case presents us with an opportunity to clarify the standards for when time spent defending or enforcing a prior consent decree is compensable under § 1988.