Lots of experts are weighing in on the government’s chances of success in its insider trading indictment against SAC Capital:
http://www.ctpost.com/news/article/Indictment-could-be-fatal-to-SAC-Capital-but-4687526.php
This indictment comes after the SEC has spent months investigating SAC’s chief executive officer Steven Cohen, apparently finding only enough evidence to charge him civilly with bad oversight of SAC (and those charges have yet to be proven). Other SAC employees have been criminally charged and convicted for insider trading, but until now the government has not charged SAC itself.
The government confronts several complications when criminally charging corporate entities for conduct of employees, including sometimes the difficulty of proving sufficient knowledge of the criminal conduct by persons in charge of the organization.
In insider trading cases, in particular, the government also must work with federal insider trading jurisprudence that does not criminalize trading on the basis of all material nonpublic information, only trading on the basis of material nonpublic information that has been misappropriated in an act of deception perpetrated upon the source of the information. Even theft of the information from the source of the information is probably not sufficient for insider trading liability if the source of the information has not somehow been “deceived” by the thief (thus, a lawyer who misappropriates client information and uses it for insider trading goes to jail, US v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997), but a person who peers into the lawyer’s briefcase on a subway and trades on the information may escape liability unless that person “deceived” someone in the process).
Because deception of the source of misappropriated information is a critical element of an insider trading charge, the government has an additional problem: the prosecution in a criminal case must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the source of the information did not know that the person entrusted with the information was likely trading on the information or tipping the information to persons who would trade on it. A showing that the source of the information did not give permission to trade is not sufficient for liability, because trading without asking for permission to trade is not necessarily an act of deception. If the source of the information did know – or the defendant can at least create a reasonable doubt that the source of the information knew – that the information would be used for securities trading, the government’s “deception” case falls apart. And with the deception element, falls apart any criminal or civil insider trading case brought under Section 10b of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. More on the “don’t ask, just tell” defense to insider trading is in an article I co-authored in 1998, Don't Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. O'Hagan, 84 Virginia Law Rev. 153 (1998):
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2675&context=faculty_scholarship
What does this have to do with legal ethics? A lot, because the seminal case defining the parameters of the “misappropriation theory” of insider trading, US v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997), involved a lawyer who, without telling his client or his law firm, took client information and used it for trading in securities markets. That was an easy case for the Supreme Court to apply its misappropriation of information theory. Just about every client expects that a lawyer will not disclose or use client information for any purpose other than helping the client, without consulting with the client first. See ABA Model Rules 1.6 and 1.8. This, however, is not necessarily true of other business relationships where people sometimes acquire nonpublic information from other people and entities, and it is anticipated that some of this information will be used for private gain, including in securities trading. Once again, all a defendant in a criminal case needs to do is create a reasonable doubt as to whether the source of the misappropriated information was “deceived” into believing it would not be used for securities trading. If the source of the information was told or already knew enough about the potential use of the information in securities markets, the “just tell” defense to the insider trading charge may be satisfied. How many of the entities from which SAC obtained material nonpublic information were not really “deceived” when and if SAC traded on it? We will learn more about this question as the prosecution proceeds, but federal insider trading law does not make the government’s case an easy one.
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