Article. Abstract:
By allowing parties to proceed on an informed basis,
liberal discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
intended to support the Rule 1’s idealized goal of securing the "just,
speedy, and inexpensive" resolution of civil cases. The large costs of
conducting discovery may instead produce the opposite result. The
creation of cross-party agency costs and the litigants’ ability to
externalize much of the effort and costs of discovery to their adversary
can generate litigation that is expensive, slow, and unjust. The
problem may be particularly acute in cases involving vast amounts of
electronically stored information, where the amount of data and
potential for externalized costs of discovery can rise exponentially.
This paper examines how the expanded use of technology can serve as de
facto procedural reform. Use of advanced technological tools such as
predictive search allow the tasks and costs to be allocated in a way
that simultaneously yields better incentives, mitigates asymmetric cost
and information problems, and reduces cross‐party agency costs. This in
turn mitigates both the problems of overdiscovery and the in terrorem
effect of discovery costs on pre‐discovery settlements. The result is
more information and lower costs, allowing the system of legal discovery
to move toward fulfilling the idealized goals of Rule 1.